Experimental plug and play quantum coin flipping by Pappa, Anna et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experimental plug and play quantum coin flipping
Citation for published version:
Pappa, A, Jouguet, P, Lawson, T, Chailloux, A, Legré, M, Trinkler, P, Kerenidis, I & Diamanti, E 2014,
'Experimental plug and play quantum coin flipping' Nature Communications. DOI: 10.1038/ncomms4717
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1038/ncomms4717
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Nature Communications
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Experimental plug&play quantum coin flipping
Anna Pappa,1, 2 Paul Jouguet,1, 3 Thomas Lawson,1 Andre´ Chailloux,2, 4
Matthieu Legre´,5 Patrick Trinkler,5 Iordanis Kerenidis,2, 6 and Eleni Diamanti1
1LTCI, CNRS - Te´le´com ParisTech, Paris, France
2LIAFA, CNRS - Universite´ Paris Diderot 7, Paris, France
3SeQureNet, Paris, France
4CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
5ID Quantique SA, Geneva, Switzerland
6Center for Quantum Technologies, National University of Singapore, Singapore
(Dated: June 17, 2013)
Performing complex cryptographic tasks will be an essential element in future quantum communica-
tion networks. These tasks are based on a handful of fundamental primitives, such as coin flipping,
where two distrustful parties wish to agree on a randomly generated bit. Although it is known
that quantum versions of these primitives can offer information-theoretic security advantages with
respect to classical protocols, a demonstration of such an advantage in a practical communication
scenario has remained elusive. Here, we experimentally implement a quantum coin flipping protocol
that performs strictly better than classically possible over a distance suitable for communication
over metropolitan area optical networks. The implementation is based on a practical plug&play sys-
tem, designed for quantum key distribution. We also show how to combine our protocol with coin
flipping protocols that are almost perfectly secure against bounded adversaries, hence enhancing
them with a level of information-theoretic security. Our results offer a powerful toolbox for future
secure quantum communications.
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2Security is an imperative in all communication net-
works. Quantum communications hold the promise of
achieving a security level that is impossible to reach by
purely classical means. Indeed, information-theoretic se-
curity has been demonstrated for the cryptographic task
of distributing a secret key between two trusted and col-
laborating communicating parties using systems exploit-
ing quantum effects [1]. However, many advanced cryp-
tographic schemes belong to a model where the two par-
ties do not trust each other and hence cannot collabo-
rate. One of the fundamental primitives in this setting
is coin flipping, in which two spatially separated dis-
trustful parties share a randomly generated bit, whose
value must be unbiased [2]. It is known that, even when
protocols are augmented with quantum communication,
perfectly secure coin flipping, i.e., with a zero bias, is
impossible without making some computational assump-
tions [3, 4]. A series of theoretical works, however, has
demonstrated that the probability that an all-powerful
malicious party can bias the coin, namely the cheating
probability, can be strictly lower than 1 in the quan-
tum setting, with an ultimate asymptotic bound of 1/
√
2
[5–11]. Coin flipping therefore provides an ideal frame-
work to demonstrate an advantage of quantum over clas-
sical communication, achieving unconditional security in
a non-cooperative model that is crucial for cryptographic
applications beyond key distribution.
To demonstrate such an advantage, we need to con-
sider all imperfections that naturally appear in practical
devices. For photonic systems, which constitute the cho-
sen architecture for quantum communications, imperfec-
tions typically appear in the form of losses in the channel
and measurement apparatus, and errors in the different
implementation stages. Furthermore, systems suitable
for long-distance communications over fiber-optic chan-
nels usually employ coherent light sources, thus becom-
ing vulnerable to attacks exploiting the non-deterministic
photon emission inherent in such sources [12].
Some of the aforementioned practical issues have been
addressed in recent theoretical and experimental stud-
ies. An analysis of the problem of loss tolerance in cur-
rent protocols provided an elegant solution [13], which
however did not account for experimental noise and the
presence of multiphoton pulses in coherent light source
implementations. The cheating probability achieved by
this protocol was slightly improved in subsequent work
[14, 15]. To account for errors, the primitive of bit string
generation was considered [16–18], but was later proven
to be possible classically. In practice, after initial proof-
of-principle demonstrations [19, 20], a recent implemen-
tation of the loss-tolerant protocol [21] used an entangled-
photon source to eliminate the problem of multiphoton
pulses. However, although in principle the cheating prob-
ability bound in the implemented protocol is independent
of losses, no quantum advantage was demonstrated for a
distance longer than a few meters. Finally, the closely
related primitive of quantum bit commitment was ex-
perimentally demonstrated in a model where adversaries
have access to an imperfect quantum memory [22]; how-
ever, the security of the protocol is entirely compromised
against all-powerful adversaries.
Here, we provide a complete theoretical and experi-
mental framework for the implementation of quantum
coin flipping in practical communication scenarios. The
protocol that we consider [23] takes all experimental
imperfections into account. We show that our protocol
can be combined with protocols that achieve almost
perfect security, i.e., a bias asymptotically close to
zero, against adversaries with bounded resources. More
explicitly, if the adversary is bounded, then the protocol
guarantees almost perfect security, while in the case of
an all-powerful adversary, the protocol still guarantees
a security level strictly higher than classically possible.
Furthermore, we experimentally implement the protocol
using a commercial plug&play system, designed for
quantum key distribution [24, 25]. The key element of
our implementation is that we take a realistic approach:
to account for the unavoidable errors in the system and
for coherent light source emission statistics, we allow
for a non-zero but small probability of abort when
both parties are honest, and accept the dependence of
the cheating probability on communication loss thus
departing from absolute loss tolerance [13, 21]. As a
result, using an appropriate benchmark for classical
coin flipping protocols [26], we can rigorously quantify
the advantage offered by quantum communication as a
function of distance, much in the way that the secret
key fraction is calculated in practical quantum key dis-
tribution implementations [1]. We demonstrate a clear
advantage for quantum coin flipping with information-
theoretic security, at a communication distance suitable
for metropolitan area network communications, with a
system that can readily be deployed in such networks.
Results
Basic quantum coin flipping protocol. The protocol
that we have analyzed and implemented is schematically
shown as Protocol 1 (see [23] for a complete theoretical
analysis). Alice sends to Bob a fixed number K of photon
pulses in states |Φαi,ci〉, each of which is prepared inde-
pendently following a random choice of basis αi and bit
ci, with i = 1, ...,K, and a fixed protocol parameter y.
Bob measures the K pulses by randomly selecting bases
βi, and replies with the position of the first successfully
measured pulse j and a random bit b. Alice then reveals
the basis and the bit used for that position: if the bases
of the two parties agree, but the measurement output of
Bob is not the same as Alice’s bit, they abort. In all
other cases, they agree that the coin value is cj ⊕ b.
3Alice Bob
choose {αi, ci}K1 choose {βi}K1
|Φαi,ci 〉−−−−−−−−−−−→ measure in basis {βi}K1
j,b∈R{0,1}←−−−−−−−−−−− j: first measured pulse
cj , αj−−−−−−−−−−−→ check
Coin: cj ⊕ b
Protocol 1. Basic quantum coin flipping protocol. The
protocol consists of the following steps: (i) Alice sends to
Bob K photon pulses. For i = 1, ...,K, she randomly
chooses a basis αi ∈ {0, 1} and a bit ci ∈ {0, 1}, such
that the state of the i-th pulse is |Φαi,ci〉, with |Φαi,0〉 =√
y|0〉+(−1)αi√1− y|1〉, |Φαi,1〉 =
√
1− y|0〉− (−1)αi√y|1〉.
(ii) For each pulse i, Bob randomly chooses βi and measures
in basis {|Φβi,0〉, |Φβi,1〉}. He sends j, the index of the first
successfully measured pulse, and a random bit b to Alice. (iii)
Alice replies by sending (αj , cj). If αj = βj , Bob checks that
his measurement outcome is indeed cj , and if not he aborts.
If he does not abort or if αj 6= βj , the coin value is c = cj ⊕ b.
A crucial feature of the protocol is the assumption that
the states are generated by an attenuated coherent light
source, which is essential for a practical implementation,
and not by a single-photon or entangled-photon source.
Therefore, each pulse contains a number of photons that
follows a Poisson distribution with mean photon number
µ. The security analysis of the protocol [23] accounts
for practical imperfections by introducing a probability
to abort even when both parties are honest. This honest
abort probability, denotedH, can be calculated as a func-
tion of all the experimental parameters, in particular the
mean photon number per pulse µ, the number of proto-
col rounds K, the channel length, the detector quantum
efficiency and dark count rate, and the error rate. Then,
optimal cheating strategies for an all-powerful malicious
party are devised for both Alice and Bob, leading to ex-
pressions for the maximal cheating probabilities, pAq and
pBq , respectively. For our protocol, p
A
q is a function of
y, while pBq depends on µ, K, and y [23]. Hence, for a
given desired honest abort probability and specific exper-
imental conditions, it is possible to minimize the cheating
probabilities by finding optimal values for the protocol
parameters µ and K. Additionally, the parameter y can
be appropriately adjusted so that pAq = p
B
q ≡ pq, which
means that the protocol is fair.
This analysis allows us to evaluate the performance
of the quantum coin flipping protocol, in terms of the
maximal cheating probability attained for any given
honest abort probability, for different communication
distances. Furthermore, a security analysis allowing for
a non-zero honest abort probability has also been per-
formed for classical coin flipping protocols [26], providing
the cheating probability bound pc = 1 −
√
H/2, for
H < 1/2, which is the honest abort probability region of
practical interest. This can be used as a benchmark to
assess quantitatively the advantage offered by the use of
quantum resources for coin flipping.
Enhancing the security of protocols against
bounded adversaries. Our basic quantum coin flip-
ping protocol provides a cheating probability for an all-
powerful adversary that is strictly lower than 1 for a wide
range of realistic parameters. It therefore achieves an
unconditional security level which is impossible classi-
cally. However, this level of security might not be use-
ful for some applications; indeed, as we show later, the
unbounded adversary can bias the coin with probabil-
ity greater than 90%. We show that our protocol can
be combined with protocols that achieve a bias asymp-
totically close to zero against bounded adversaries. As
a result, such a combined protocol achieves an almost
perfect security against bounded adversaries and, in ad-
dition, provides a level of security against unbounded ad-
versaries that is strictly better than classically possible.
Let us explain how we construct a combined proto-
col. We discern three stages, as in the commonly used
protocols against bounded adversaries, including classical
protocols employing one-way functions [27] and quantum
protocols in the noisy quantum storage model [22, 28]. In
the first stage (commit), which remains unchanged from
the protocols against bounded adversaries, Alice and Bob
exchange classical or quantum messages such that at the
end of this stage each party has almost perfectly com-
mitted to one bit, S and T , respectively. In the second
stage (encrypt), Alice and Bob encrypt their respective
random bits using the committed values. In particu-
lar, Alice sends K pulses using the states |Φαi,ci⊕S〉, for
i = 1, ...,K, and Bob replies by sending T ⊕ b as well
as j, the index of the first measured pulse, as in the ba-
sic protocol. In the third stage (reveal), Alice and Bob
reveal (cj , S) and (b, T ), respectively, together with addi-
tional information depending on the underlying bounded
adversary model and, if nobody aborts, the value of the
coin is cj ⊕ b.
In Methods, we provide the combined protocols for
two realistic models, one with computationally bounded
adversaries and the other with adversaries with noisy
quantum storage. In both cases, when the adversaries
are bounded, we achieve the same, almost perfect,
security as the original protocols; additionally, when the
adversaries are unbounded, they still cannot cheat with
a probability higher than the one provided by our basic
quantum coin flipping protocol. Hence, the combined
protocols offer the maximal possible security guarantees.
Experimental quantum coin flipping results. The
basic quantum coin flipping protocol is tailored for a
practical implementation using an attenuated coherent
light source. We perform the experimental demonstra-
4DL
FM
BS
PBS:TPolarizationTBeamTSplitter
BF:TBandpassTFilter
BS:TBeamTSplitter
PM:TPhaseTModulator
FM:TFaradayTMirror
APD:TAPDTdetector
Ali
ce
Me
asu
rem
ent
bas
is β
i
Bo
b
C:TCirculator
LA
SE
R
C
BS
PM
AP
D
PB
S
Sy
nch
ron
iza
tio
n
and
 po
we
r c
on
tro
l
PM
DL:TDelayTLine
AP
DPr
epa
rat
ion
 ba
sis
 α i
Bit
 c i
Co
eff
icie
nt 
y
BS
VA
TT
Me
an
ph
oto
n n
um
ber
 μ
Figure 1. Experimental setup of the quantum coin flipping plug&play system. The laser source at Bob’s setup emits
photon pulses at a wavelength of 1550 nm and with an intensity of -13.5 dBm. These are separated at a 50/50 beamsplitter
(BS) and then recombined at a polarization beam splitter (PBS), after having traveled through a short and a long arm, which
contains a phase modulator and is appropriately arranged to transform horizontally polarized to vertically polarized states and
vice versa. The pulses then travel to Alice through the communication channel, are reflected on a Faraday mirror, appropriately
modulated and attenuated, and travel back to Bob orthogonally polarized. As a result, the pulses now take the other path
at Bob’s side and arrive simultaneously at the beamsplitter, where they interfere. Finally, they are detected by two InGaAs
avalanche photodiode (APD) single-photon detectors. In our implementation, the quantum efficiency and dark count rate per
detection gate of the detectors before and after the circulator, were 7.4% and 2 × 10−6, and 7.7% and 6 × 10−6, respectively.
To implement the quantum coin flipping protocol, Alice chooses her basis and bit values by applying a suitable phase shift
to the second pulse with her phase modulator. This modulator is also used to apply the state coefficient y. She also uses
her variable attenuator to apply the required attenuation for a desired mean photon number per pulse µ. Bob chooses his
measurement basis by applying an appropriate phase shift at the first pulse on its way back using his phase modulator. This
interferometric setup compensates for all fluctuations in the channel. The two-way configuration demands particular care in the
synchronization of the phase shift and attenuation signals, and the detection gates. This is achieved in practice by appropriate
calibration procedures.
tion using the commercial system Clavis2 of IDQuan-
tique [24], which is designed for quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD). The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1.
This so-called plug&play system relies on an autocom-
pensating interferometric setup, which guarantees excel-
lent system stability. A two-way approach is employed:
light pulses at 1550 nm are sent from Bob to Alice, who
uses a phase modulator to encode her information. The
pulses are then reflected by a Faraday mirror and atten-
uated to the desired level before being sent back to Bob.
Finally, Bob chooses a measurement basis with his phase
modulator and registers the detection events using two
single-photon detectors. When the BB84 QKD protocol
[29] is implemented by the plug&play system, the states
prepared by Alice and measured by Bob correspond to
the states |Φαi,ci〉 used in our quantum coin flipping pro-
tocol, with y = 1/2. Hence, the quantum transmission
stage of the QKD protocol is identical to that of the quan-
tum coin flipping protocol with the exception that, in the
latter, y should be appropriately modified to guarantee
the fairness of the implemented protocol. In practice,
this parameter is set using the control signal that drives
Alice’s phase modulator, which is also used to encode
Alice’s basis and bit information.
Let us now describe the experimental procedure. We
perform quantum coin flipping experiments for two chan-
nel lengths, namely 15 and 25 km. In Table I we pro-
vide typical values of the experimental parameters used
in the implementations. For each channel length, Alice
sets the average photon number per pulse µ with the
variable attenuator shown in Fig. 1, using a previously
established calibration relationship. It is important to
note that typical uses of the Clavis2 for QKD employ
significantly higher µ values, hence our implementation
required operating the system in previously untested pa-
rameter regimes, and appropriately adjusting the calibra-
tion and synchronization procedures.
The quantum transmission part of the protocol is sub-
sequently implemented, leading to a set of data contain-
ing the preparation and measurement basis choices of
Alice and Bob, respectively, and the measurement out-
comes of Bob, similarly to the raw key data obtained
in quantum key distribution experiments. Based on this
515 km 25 km
Coefficient y 0.88 0.85
µ (×10−3) 2.8 ±0.1 2.1 ± 0.1 5.1± 0.1 4 ± 0.1
Protocol rounds K 65700 95700 88900 120000
Cheating probability 0.909 ± 0.001 0.907 ± 0.001 0.933 ± 0.002 0.929 ± 0.002
Table I. Experimental parameter values for honest abort probability H = 1%. The parameters correspond to a fair
protocol, for which the cheating probabilities for a malicious Alice or Bob are the same. This is ensured by the choice of
the coefficient y. To perform an experiment for a specific value of the average photon number per pulse µ, Alice applies a
control signal to her variable attenuator, according to a previously established calibration relationship. The difference between
the value of µ expected by this relationship given the known experimental conditions in the path from Bob’s laser to Alice’s
attenuator, and the value of µ deduced from the actual detection events and the conditions in the path between Alice’s output
and Bob’s detectors, gives rise to the reported uncertainty in this value. For a given channel length, the number of required
rounds, and hence the protocol runtime, decreases for higher µ values, at the expense of slightly higher cheating probabilities.
The size of the detection event data used to calculate the rounds K required to obtain the specific honest abort probability is
sufficiently large (typically 3 × 105) to ensure that the finite-size effects in our implementation are negligible. For the specific
system parameters, the cheating probability can then be computed using the security analysis of the basic quantum coin flipping
protocol. The highlighted parameters correspond to the values shown in Fig. 2.
data, we calculate the number of protocol rounds K that
are required to achieve a desired honest abort probability.
The detection events registered by Bob, in conjunction
with the known experimental conditions in the path be-
tween Alice and Bob, can be used to determine the actual
average photon number per pulse µ that is exiting Alice’s
system. In practice, we find that this value is slightly dif-
ferent from the one estimated by the variable attenuator
calibration relationship. This difference is at the origin
of the uncertainty in the values of µ shown in Table I.
The described experimental procedure is performed us-
ing several values of µ for each channel length, and then
choosing the number of rounds K to attain the desired
honest abort probability. Based on these sets of param-
eters, we derive the cheating probabilities of a malicious
Alice and Bob, pAq and p
B
q , respectively, using the secu-
rity analysis of the basic quantum coin flipping proto-
col. This allows us to find, for both channel lengths, the
sets of values for µ, K and y that minimize the cheating
probability and at the same time make the protocol fair
(pAq = p
B
q ≡ pq). Note that for simplicity, the y values of
our experimental data have been chosen independently
of the honest abort probability value; in practice, slight
modifications of these values might be required to achieve
a perfectly fair protocol for each specific honest abort
probability. The optimized experimental parameters for
an honest abort probability H = 1% are highlighted in
Table I.
In Fig. 2 we show the cheating probability calculated
from our experimental data for 15 and 25 km, as a func-
tion of the honest abort probability. For each value of the
honest abort probability, the number of rounds K and
mean photon number per pulse µ has been optimized as
explained previously. The uncertainty in the estimation
of µ is illustrated by the shaded areas in the plot. To
quantify the advantage offered by quantum communica-
tion, we use the classical cheating probability bound, pc
[26]. We can see that the cheating probability is strictly
lower than classically possible for both distances, and for
practical values of honest abort probabilities.
To obtain further insight into our results, we define a
gain function, as follows:
G = pc − pq,
where pc and pq are the classical cheating probability
bound and the quantum cheating probability value de-
rived from our experimental data, respectively. If the ex-
perimental data yields a positive G for a certain honest
abort probability, this means that these results cannot
be obtained by any purely classical means. We can then
use the gain as a figure of merit to assess the performance
of our quantum coin flipping implementation in a secure
communication scenario. In Fig. 3, we show the gain as
a function of distance, for a fixed honest abort probabil-
ity H = 1%. The channel length of 25 km is close to the
cut-off distance for which a positive gain can be obtained,
however this range is sufficient for many applications re-
quiring communication over metropolitan area networks.
Note that, contrary to quantum key distribution, here
no classical error-correction process can be implemented
since Alice and Bob do not trust each other, which results
in an inherent limitation to the attainable communica-
tion distance. Using better single-photon detectors [30],
with lower dark count rates, for instance, would extend
the communication distance of our protocol.
Finally, in our implementation, the classical steps
of the coin flipping protocol following the quantum
transmission are not performed in real time. However,
it is clear that the coin flipping rate will be dominated
by the time that it takes for K pulses to travel from
60.004 0.006 0.008 0.01 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.018 0.02
0.9
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
Honestuabortuprobability
C
he
at
in
gu
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
15ukm
25ukm
Classicalubound
Figure 2. Cheating probability as a function of hon-
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km. The cheating probability for each honest abort prob-
ability value is calculated from the experimental data using
the security analysis of the basic quantum coin flipping pro-
tocol. The values correspond to a fair protocol. The shaded
areas are derived from the uncertainty in the estimation of
the average photon number per pulse exiting Alice’s setup.
The solid line represents the cheating probability bound for
classical coin flipping protocols. For both channel lengths,
quantum communication leads to lower cheating probability
values than is classically possible, for a range of practical hon-
est abort probabilities.
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Figure 3. Gain as a function of channel length. The gain
function is calculated as the difference between the classical
and quantum cheating probability, and illustrates the advan-
tage offered by the use of quantum communication for coin
flipping. The red squares correspond to the cheating proba-
bilities achieved by our plug&play implementation for 15 and
25 km, for a fixed honest abort probability of 1%. A positive
gain is obtained for both distances. For comparison, previous
experimental results based on an entangled-photon source im-
plementation of a loss-tolerant quantum coin flipping protocol
[21] are also shown (blue circles): a positive gain is obtained
only for a very short distance (10 m), with an honest abort
probability of 1.8%.
Alice to Bob. For a laser pulse repetition rate of 10
MHz, this corresponds roughly to a few tens of coin flips
per second. As we can see in Table I, if Alice increases
the average photon per pulse exiting her system, the
required number of protocol rounds reduces, which also
reduces the runtime for the protocol, but this comes at
the expense of a slightly higher cheating probability.
Hence, in a real communication scenario of two distrust-
ful parties wishing to agree on a coin value using the
plug&play system, the parties would be given a choice
of gain values for a range of honest abort probabilities
given their communication distance and the desired
communication rate. This parameter choice will have an
effect on the security only in the case of an unbounded
adversary, since in the bounded models the bias achieved
by our combined protocols is asymptotically close to zero.
Discussion. We have rigorously demonstrated a signif-
icant advantage of quantum over classical communica-
tion with information-theoretic security guarantees us-
ing the fundamental cryptographic primitive of coin flip-
ping. Furthermore, we have demonstrated this advan-
tage using a commercial plug&play system, which does
not require any entangled-photon or quantum memory
resources, over distances suitable for metropolitan area
communication networks. This greatly enlarges the scope
of unconditionally secure quantum cryptography, in par-
ticular to the case where the parties do not trust each
other.
Additionally, by combining our quantum coin flipping
protocol with protocols secure against bounded adver-
saries we enhance them with a level of information-
theoretic security. It is interesting to note that our pro-
tocol is based on a bit commitment scheme, augmented
only by an additional classical message from Bob to Alice
between the commit and reveal stages. This means that
our combined coin flipping protocols can also be viewed
as commitment schemes where both parties commit some
value to each other. Hence, our security analysis can be
extended in a straightforward way to hold for bit com-
mitment in the computational models that we have con-
sidered. In the same way, our implementation indeed
performs plug&play quantum bit commitment.
As in practical quantum key distribution, our imple-
mentation of quantum coin flipping may be vulnerable
to side-channel attacks. The power control setup placed
at the entrance of Alice’s system as a countermeasure
for the so-called Trojan horse attacks [31] can also be
used, incidentally, to counter a possible attack where
Bob sends strong light pulses to Alice, which lead to
an increased average photon number per pulse and
consequently to a greater cheating probability. Identi-
fying other potential side-channel attacks and devising
appropriate countermeasures is of great importance, as
for all practical quantum cryptographic systems.
7Methods
Combined quantum coin flipping protocols. We
show how to combine the basic quantum coin flipping
protocol with protocols that achieve almost perfect se-
curity against adversaries that possess limited resources.
We consider, in particular, computationally bounded ad-
versaries and adversaries with noisy quantum storage.
The computationally bounded protocol, shown as Pro-
tocol 2, uses an injective one-way function f , upon which
Alice and Bob have previously agreed [27]. In the com-
mit stage of the protocol, Alice and Bob choose random
strings, xA and xB , respectively, and commit to the bits
h(xA) and h(xB) by exchanging f(xA) and f(xB), where
h is a hardcore predicate of f . Hardcore predicates make
it impossible to guess the value h(x) from f(x) with prob-
ability greater than one half. A good example of a hard-
core predicate function is the parity of the bits in a string,
since it can be proven [27] that given the parity and the
image of the string, it is not feasible to guess the string
itself. Moreover, since f is an injective one-way function,
by sending the values f(x), neither of the two parties
can lie about the value of their chosen string and thus
change the value h(x). Hence, at the end of this stage
Alice and Bob have almost perfectly committed to h(xA)
and h(xB). In the encrypt stage, for i = 1, ...,K, Alice
randomly selects αi and ci and sends the K quantum
states |Φαi,ci⊕h(xA)〉 to Bob, prepared in the same way
as in the basic protocol. Bob performs a measurement in
the randomly selected bases {|Φβi,0〉, |Φβi,1〉}, and replies
with the position j of the first successfully measured pulse
and a random bit b encrypted as b ⊕ h(xB). Finally, in
the reveal stage, Alice and Bob reveal their strings and
check that they are consistent with the function outputs
exchanged during the commit phase. They also exchange
their chosen bit and Bob aborts only if αj = βj and his
measurement outcome does not agree with cj . If he does
not abort, then the value of the coin is cj ⊕ b. Note that
the encrypt stage and the first step of the reveal stage
correspond to our basic quantum coin flipping protocol,
slightly modified to fit the underlying computationally
bounded model.
Concerning the security analysis, if Alice is computa-
tionally bounded, then she cannot guess the value h(xB)
with probability greater than one half, which means
that Bob’s bit b is perfectly hidden from her when Bob
sends b⊕ h(xB). Therefore, the protocol remains almost
perfectly secure against Alice. If Bob is computation-
ally bounded, then the bits cj are perfectly hidden as
cj ⊕ h(xA), hence the protocol remains almost perfectly
secure against Bob. If, on the other hand, the parties
are unbounded, they can perfectly compute the hardcore
predicates and the security of the protocol becomes ex-
actly the same as the security of our basic coin flipping
protocol.
Alice Bob
choose xA
f(xA)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ choose xB
f(xB)←−−−−−−−−−−−−
choose {αi, ci}K1
|Φαi,ci⊕h(xA)〉−−−−−−−−−−−−→ measure in {βi}K1
j, b⊕h(xB)←−−−−−−−−−−−− j: first measured pulse,
b ∈R {0, 1}
xA, cj , αj−−−−−−−−−−−−→
xB , b←−−−−−−−−−−−−
Coin: cj ⊕ b
Protocol 2. Computationally-bounded quantum coin
flipping.
In the noisy storage protocol [22], shown as Protocol 3,
the parties first agree on an error-correcting code. This
is followed by a prepare stage, where Alice sends to Bob
2n quantum states, which are the states used in the ba-
sic protocol, with y = 1/2. Bob measures the states
using randomly chosen bases {bˆi}2n1 . At the end of this
procedure, Alice has a string containing the bits used
to construct the states, namely X2n = Xn1X
n
2 , and Bob
has a string containing his measurement results, namely
X˜2n = X˜n1 X˜
n
2 . If the choices of the states and the mea-
surement bases are uniformly random, then the strings
agree on approximately half of the positions.
The parties then perform the main coin flipping pro-
tocol. In the commit stage, Alice and Bob commit to
bits DA = Ext(X
n
1 , r) and DB = Ext(X˜
n
2 , r˜), respec-
tively, where Ext : {0, 1}n ⊗ R → {0, 1} is a family of
2-universal hash functions, and (r, r˜) are strings chosen
by Alice and Bob in order to randomly pick a hash func-
tion from this family. To this end, they first calculate the
syndromes w = Syn(Xn1 ) and w˜ = Syn(X˜
n
2 ) based on
the chosen error-correcting code, and commit to the ex-
tractor function values by exchanging the syndromes and
half of the bases’ values they used in the measurements.
In the encrypt stage, Alice encrypts her bit choices cj
by sending K states |Φαj ,cj⊕DA〉, prepared as in the ba-
sic protocol. Bob chooses randomly βj and measures in
{|Φβj ,0〉, |Φβj ,1〉}. He then encrypts a bit b by sending
b ⊕ DB to Alice, together with the index m of the first
successfully measured pulse. Finally, in the reveal stage,
Alice and Bob reveal their string and bit values and check
that for the positions with the same bases, Xn2 coincides
with X˜n2 and X
n
1 coincides with X˜
n
1 , respectively. They
also check that the syndromes and extractor outputs cor-
respond to the received strings. If the measurement out-
come for the first measured pulse agrees with the revealed
bit for the same choice of bases or if the bases are differ-
8ent, they agree on the coin, otherwise they abort. Again,
the encrypt stage and the first step of the reveal stage
correspond to the basic quantum coin flipping protocol.
Alice Bob
choose {bi, xi}2n1
|Φbi,xi 〉−−−−−−−−−−−−→ measure in {bˆi}2n1
String: String:
X2n = Xn1 X
n
2 X˜
2n = X˜n1 X˜
n
2
|Xn1 | = |Xn1 | = n, |X˜n1 | = |X˜n1 | = n
Wait time ∆t
w = Syn(Xn1 ), w˜ = Syn(X˜
n
2 ),
string r string r˜
DA = Ext(X
n
1 , r)
{bi}n/21 , w, r−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ DB = Ext(X˜n2 , r˜)
{b˜i}nn/2+1, w˜, r˜←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
choose {αj , cj}K1
|Φαj,cj⊕DA 〉−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ measure in {βj}K1
DB⊕b, m←−−−−−−−−−−−−− m: 1st measured pulse
Xn1 ,cm−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
X˜n2 , b←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
check: check:
Syn(X˜n2 ) = w˜ Syn(X
n
1 ) = w
Ext(X˜n2 , r˜) = DB Ext(X
n
1 , r) = DA
Coin: cm ⊕ b
Protocol 3. Noisy storage quantum coin flipping.
The noisy storage limitation together with the wait-
ing time ∆t that is imposed on the parties, forces them
to measure any quantum state they might have wanted
to keep unmeasured in order to improve their cheating
strategy. Bob is forced to measure the states sent by
Alice and Alice is forced to measure whatever entangled
share she may have kept when sending the states to Bob.
Concerning the security analysis, if Alice has noisy
storage, then she cannot guess the value DB with
probability greater than one half, hence Bob’s bit b
is perfectly hidden from her when Bob sends b ⊕ DB .
Therefore, the protocol remains almost perfectly secure
against Alice. If Bob has noisy storage, then again the
bits cj are perfectly hidden as cj ⊕DA and the protocol
remains almost perfectly secure against Bob. If, on
the other hand, the parties have perfect memory, they
can perfectly compute the values DA and DB and the
security of the protocol reduces exactly to the security
of our basic quantum coin flipping protocol.
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